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Malpractice by Veterinarians
Martin J. Strobel*
V ETERINARIANS AND VETERINARY SURGEONS are practitioners of
the art of treating diseases and injuries of domestic animals,
surgically or medically.'
Standard Requirements of the Profession
All states, except Alaska, have licensing statutes for veteri-
narians.2 The requirements vary from state to state, but, in
general, all states require graduation from an accredited school
of veterinary medicine, followed by an examination on certain
prescribed subjects in the field.3 It has been argued unsuccess-
fully4 that non-graduate veterinarians constitute one "school"
and graduate veterinarians another, and that each has its own
standards. Courts have held that a school of medicine relates to
the system of diagnosis and treatment rather than to the amount
or extent of the learning and information of members of the
profession.
In addition to the educational prerequisites to the practice
of veterinary medicine, all veterinary biologics, and the firms
that produce them are licensed and inspected, thereby guaran-
teeing the products' safety and potency, as well as insuring ac-
curate labelling as to care, use and limitation.(
There are eighteen veterinary medical colleges in the United
States,7 and approximately 22,000 veterinarians. About 65 mil-
lion dollars a year is spent by the federal government on activi-
* B.A., Columbia Univ.; Researcher, Legal Dept. of Cuyahoga County Wel-
fare Dept.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Bald-
win-Wallace College.
1 Tucker v. Williamson, 229 Fed. 201 (S. D. Ohio, 1915); Lyford v. Martin,
79 Minn. 243, 82 N. W. 479 (1900); 70 C. J. S. Physicians and Surgeons § 1
(1951).
2 Note, The Corporate Practice of Veterinary Medicine, 46 Iowa L. Rev.
850 n. 45 (1961) (state by state breakdown on licensing statutes for vet-
erinarians).
3 Staff of Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Veter-
inary Medical Science and Human Health (Comm. Print, 1961) [herein-
after cited as Senate Report on Veterinary Medicine].
4 Bekkemo v. Erickson, 186 Minn. 108, 242 N. W. 617 (1932).
5 Id. at 619.
6 Senate Report on Veterinary Medicine, op. cit. supra note 3 at 9.
7 Id. at XXI. (Introduction)
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ties of a direct veterinary nature.8 It is rather surprising that
so little has been written in the past thirty years describing
the legal duties of the veterinarian.
Duty of Care
Since the major portion of litigation against the veterinarian
has been for malpractice and negligence,9 let us consider the
general rules by which he is bound and the standard to which
he is held.
The rules governing the duty and liability of physicians and
surgeons in the performance of professional services are ap-
plicable as well to veterinarians.1" Thus, a veterinarian is bound
to use, in performing the duties of his employment, such reason-
able attention and skill as may ordinarily be expected of careful,
skillful, and trustworthy members of his profession in his neigh-
borhood or vicinity. And, he is answerable for the result of his
lack of skill or care.'1
Applying this general rule, the courts have held veteri-
narians liable for negligence in surgical operations, 12 negligence
in connection with inoculation or vaccination, 13 injury traceable
to improper diagnosis, 14 and injury caused by improper care and
treatment of animals.15
Although the broad basis of a veterinarian's liability for mal-
practice is to be tested by the rules applicable to physicians and
surgeons, 16 there are aspects of treatment and practice peculiar
8 1I at XI. (Introduction)
9 Soave, An Introduction to Veterinary Law 65 (1962).
10 Storozuc v. W. A. Butler Co., 3 Ohio Misc. 60, 203 N. E. 2d 511 (Ohio
Common Pleas, 1964). ("Malpractice" in Ohio Rev. Code, § 2305.11 includes
practice of Veterinary Medicine); 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 88 (1942); 21 R. C. L. Physicians and Surgeons § 31 (1918); See also Has-
sard, Professional Liability Claims Prevention, 163 J. A. M. A. 1267 (1957)("malpractice" applies to all professional services furnished on a contract
basis).
1 McNew v. Decatur Veterinary Hospital, Inc., 85 Ga. App. 54, 68 S. E. 2d
221 (1951); Barney v. Pinkham, 29 Neb. 350, 45 N. W. 694 (1890); Boom v.
Reed, 69 Hun 426, 23 N. Y. Supp. 421 (1893); Annot., 38 A. L. R. 2d 503 at
505 (1954).
12 Annot., 38 A. L. R. 2d 503 at 511 (1954).
13 Id. at 512.
14 Id. at 509.
15 Id. at 506.
16 Note 10 supra.
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to the field of veterinary medicine, which prevent blanket ap-
plication of these rules. Concern for the personal and confi-
dential relationship that exist between practitioner and client
in the legal profession, physician and patient in the medical pro-
fession, is not applicable to the practice of veterinary medicine,
since no personal secrets are revealed to the veterinarian in
order for him to render his services effectively. 17 Yet, this very
fact indicates the veterinarian's difficulty in conducting a clini-
cal examination of his patient.
Animals are unable to describe their symptoms; they vary
so widely in their reaction to handling and examination that a
wide range of normality must be permitted in their physical ex-
amination. While some species, such as dogs and horses, be-
cause of their size, and because they are accustomed to human
company, are relatively good subjects, sheep, goats and pigs are
more difficult to handle.'
In the case of Breece v. Ragan, 19 a veterinarian, engaged to
inoculate fifty-nine head of plaintiff's cattle, was charged with
negligence in placing all the cattle in one small barn and be-
ginning to inject them while they were loose in the barn, by
jabbing a hypodermic needle into their necks or shoulders. In
the process of inoculation the cattle became frightened and
trampled each other. After some time, the veterinarian ordered
the cattle released from the barn, at which time it was discovered
that a number of cattle had died from the effects of having been
trampled and smothered by the others. The court held that since
the veterinarian was supposedly trained in his job, he should
have desisted or resorted to some other method as soon as he
noticed that his actions were exciting the cattle.
While in Breece20 the veterinarian was held liable for in-
juries incurred during the course of treatment, the cases on mal-
practice by veterinarians go even further, and hold the veteri-
narian liable for negligence preparatory to treatment, where
such negligent preparation results in injury. 2I Thus, in the case
of Beck v. Henkle-Craig Livestock Co.,22 in order to perform
17 Op. cit. supra note 2 at 856.
18 Blood and Henderson, Veterinary Medicine 2 (2d ed. 1963).
19 Breece v. Ragan, 234 Mo. App. 1093, 138 S. W. 2d 758 (1940).
20 Id. at 759.
21 Op. cit. supra note 11 at 508.
22 Beck v. Henkle-Craig Livestock Co., 171 N. C. 698, 88 S. E. 865 (1916).
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an operation on a mule for knots in its shoulder, the veterinarian
placed the mule in a stall used for the purpose of confining
unruly animals. The stall was so constructed as to require three
bars to hold the animal inside. Only the top bar was put in
position. As a result, while the operation was being performed,
the mule backed under the bar and seriously injured its spine.
The court held that it was the veterinarian's duty to see that the
mule was properly confined, so as not to injure itself, before
commencement of the operation.
Again, where the veterinarian was engaged to cauterize a
spavin (a disease of the hock joint of horses, producing lame-
ness) on a horse, and threw the horse to the ground, prepara-
tory to the application of the treatment, in such a negligent man-
ner as to cause a rupture of the animal's diaphragm, the court
considered the throwing to be part of the treatment, and allowed
the plaintiff to recover for defendant's negligence and lack of
skill in performing the operation.2 3
The three cases discussed above 24 illustrate that from the
time a veterinarian approaches an animal he is about to treat or
examine, he may incur liability if he is negligent. Considered to
be one who knows animals and their reactions, a veterinarian
should know how to restrain them properly. This does not mean
that he must anticipate their every move, but he should recog-
nize what actions or methods of treatment are likely to frighten
an animal and possibly cause it harm.2
Improper Diagnosis
In the area of diagnosis too, there are certain aspects pe-
culiar to the practice of veterinary medicine.
Careful questioning of the owner or attendant about the
diet, recent vaccination, surgery, or the introduction of newly
acquired animals into the group, may provide clues to a success-
ful diagnosis. Thus, rejection of a particular disease merely be-
cause there has never been a case of it on the particular farm
in question, when, in fact, the patient has been purchased only
23 Staples v. Steed, 167 Ala. 241, 52 So. 646 (1910), later proceedings in 6
Ala. App. 594, 60 So. 499 (1912).
24 Ibid.; Breece v. Ragan, supra note 19; Beck v. Henkle-Craig Livestock
Co., supra note 22.
25 Soave, op. cit. supra note 9 at 71.
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a few weeks previous to examination, represents a serious error
of omission on the part of the veterinarian.
26
Problems such as the measurement of the relative humidity
of a barn and its importance as a factor in the outbreak of
pneumonia, can present insuperable difficulties to the veteri-
narian. In a case of arsenic poisoning, even the most detailed
examination of the animal and the most careful questioning of
the owner may fail to elicit the evidence necessary for a correct
diagnosis. Only a careful search for a source of arsenic can
provide the information. Neglect of one aspect of the clinical
examination can render useless a great deal of work and lead
to an error in diagnosis.27
Proximate Cause and Liability
In order to recover for the negligence of a veterinarian it
must be shown that such negligence is the proximate cause of
the injury or death of the animals treated by him.2-s
While it is a relatively easy matter to observe the cause
and effect where a herd of cattle is frightened when jabbed with
needles, it is much more difficult to determine the causal rela-
tion where the basis for the malpractice action is improper diag-
nosis. Generally, in malpractice actions against physicians there
is no presumption of negligence from error of judgment in diag-
nosis or treatment.29 The same rule applies to veterinarians. 30
Illustrative of the particular difficulty encountered in con-
necting improper diagnosis or treatment by a veterinarian with
the death of an animal is the case of Phillips v. Leuth,3 1 in which
the defendant veterinarian advised vaccination of plaintiff's en-
tire herd of hogs for hog cholera. Shortly after vaccination the
hogs died. Alleging improper vaccination as the cause of death,
plaintiff introduced expert testimony to the effect that the hogs
did not die of cholera but of septic poisoning. The court held
that the presence of a number of swine diseases in the area with
26 Blood and Henderson, op. cit. supra note 18 at 2.
27 Id. at 1.
28 Phillips v. Leuth, 200 Iowa 272, 204 N. W. 301 (1925); Breece v. Ragan,
supra note 19; Erickson v. Webber, 58 S. D. 446, 237 N. W. 558 (1931);
Prahl v. Gerhard, 25 Wise. 466 (1870); Soave, op. cit. supra note 9 at 69.
29 Nicholas v. Jacobson, 113 Calif. App. 382, 298 P. 505 (1931); Pendergraft
v. Royster, 203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932).
30 Note 10 supra.
31 Phillips v. Leuth, supra note 28.
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the same symptoms as cholera, was a presumptive explanation
of the cause of the sickness.
Similarly, since in its incipient stages cholera cannot be de-
tected, a high death rate resulting from the application of a
remedy for its prevention may lead to an inference that the
hogs already had the disease and that a serum, administered
after an additional injection of virus, could not counteract the
disease.3 2
Thus, the burden is upon plaintiff to produce some evi-
dence to single out defendant's alleged negligence as the cause,
and to that extent negate the other possible causes-a difficult
undertaking to say the least! But, failure of the veterinarian to
comply with vaccination regulations constitutes negligence
per se33 and certainly may serve plaintiff's cause.
Contributory Negligence
In Breece34 the veterinarian defended on the ground that
the farm owner helped him drive the cattle into the barn and
was, therefore, contributorily negligent. The court held, in es-
sence, that the farmer's action was not so closely allied with the
loss as to bar his recovery for damages sustained since his act
was not the direct cause of the casualty, absent which the loss
would not have occurred.
On the other hand, the negligent act of an owner or his
agent in handling his hogs, after their shipment to him, would
preclude recovery, even though he might be able to show the
veterinarian of defendant serum company, who had inoculated
the hogs, had been negligent in failing to discover that they
were unhealthy and unfit for shipment.35
Agency
Illustrative of the courts' reliance on basic agency principles
in attributing negligence to a veterinarian is the case of Acher-
man v. Robertson,36 where the veterinarian's son, in the habit
of assisting his father in practice, delivered to plaintiff a bottle
32 Erickson v. Weber, supra note 28.
33 Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Comm'n Co., 85 Id. 64, 375 P. 2d 704
(1962).
34 Breece v. Ragan, supra note 19.
35 Sissell v. Sihler Serum Co., 110 Kan. 446, 204 Pac. 988 (1922).
36 Ackerman v. Robertson, 240 Wis. 421, 3 N. W. 2d 723 (1942).
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of what was labelled "Liquor Cresolis Spanetus," thinking it to
be the latin term for mange oil. In fact it was lysol and caused
the death of plaintiff's hogs. The court held that, since the son
had accompanied his father on numerous professional calls to
plaintiff's farm, and had assisted in the vaccination of animals,
and in other professional operations, there was sufficient ap-
pearance of agency to cause plaintiff to rely on his skill and care.
Gratuitous Undertaking
There is no obligation on the part of a veterinarian to ac-
cept a case.37 However, once the case has been accepted the
veterinarian may be liable for negligence in treatment even
though the services rendered are gratuitous, where the under-
taking requires care and skill, and the veterinarian has failed to
exercise the degree of skill reasonable for the undertaking.3 s
However, the nature and extent of the duty owed, if any,
depends on the circumstances under which the services were
undertaken. 9 Thus, where the defendant did not hold himself
out to be a competent veterinarian, but was merely a "student"
who disclosed this fact to the plaintiff, and undertook the treat-
ment gratuitously, he was not held liable.40 Yet, the same service
if performed by one claiming to be a competent surgeon might
justly be characterized as negligent and unskillful.4 1
The intricacy or delicacy of the operation undertaken also
may determine the liability or lack of it where the operator pre-
tends no skill. Thus, applying the general rules of bailment, the
court in Connor v. Winton42 held that when an act such as
lancing is done gratis by one pretending no skill, it is termed a
mandate. The mandatory is bound only to slight diligence and
is responsible only for gross neglect. He is held only to the
exercise of the degree of care to which persons of common
prudence are accustomed in looking after their own property.
37 Soave, op. cit. supra note 9 at 74; Hannah, Disaster and the Veterinar-
ian's Liability, 141 J. A. V. M. A. 611 (1962).
38 Latham v. Elrod, 6 Ala. App. 456, 60 So. 428 (1912); Morrison v. Altig,
157 Iowa 265, 138 N. W. 510, reversed on rehearing, 154 Iowa 559, 134 N. W.
529 (1912).
39 Connor v. Winton, 8 Ind. 315, 65 Am. Dec. 761 (1856); Morrison v. Altig,
supra note 38; Pecheos v. Johnson, 106 Wash. 163, 179 Pac. 78 (1919).
40 Morrison v. Altig, supra note 38.
41 Latham v. Elrod, supra note 38; Connor v. Winton, supra note 39; Mor-
rison v. Altig, supra note 38.
42 Connor v. Winton, supra note 39 at 318.
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However:
What would be simply negligence as to one thing would
be gross negligence as to another. What might have been
due diligence on the part of Winton in thrusting his lance
into a vein of the horse's neck, might have been very gross
negligence in lancing the complicated and delicate ma-
chinery of the hock joint.43
Express Warranty
We have been discussing the liability of a veterinarian from
the standpoint of negligence as predicated upon the violation of
a duty of care. The common law liability requires only per-
formance with reasonable skill and care,44 and under ordinary
circumstances the prudent veterinarian will not guarantee a cure,
nor does he in the absence of a special contract to do so under-
take to perform a cure.45 By expressly warranting that an
animal will get well the veterinarian absolutely engages to make
good the loss, even if the animal dies without anyone's negli-
gence. As warrantor the veterinarian chances the hazards of
weather, intervening diseases, and the like, and renders himself
liable for the damage caused thereby.46 The issues as to whether
a contract to perform a cure exists or has been performed are
questions of fact.47
Abandonment
Although, as has been mentioned earlier,4 s a veterinarian is
not legally bound to accept a case, once an animal has been ac-
cepted for treatment, the veterinarian is clearly liable for
abandoning the treatment without reasonable notice or special
agreement to do so.49 The veterinarian's duties are not termi-
nated until his contract is revoked by his dismissal, terminated
by mutual consent, or his services are no longer required.50
43 Id. at 319.
44 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 133 (2d ed. 1955).
45 Ibid.; Barney v. Pinkham, supra note 11; Kuehn v. Wilson, 13 Wis. 116
(1860).
46 Kuehn v. Wilson, supra note 45 at 121.
47 Lyford v. Martin, supra note 1.
48 See cases cited note 38 supra.
49 Williams v. Gilman, 71 Me. 21 (1880); Boom v. Reed, supra note 11.
50 Soave, op. cit. supra note 9 at 74. See generally, Annot., 56 A. L. R. 818
(1928); Annot., 60 A. L. R. 664 (1929).
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Expert Testimony
Ordinarily, expert testimony is required in a malpractice
action to show that the damage or injury was caused by an un-
skillful or negligent act.5 1 For example, expert testimony was
required to hold a veterinarian liable for failure to diagnose
such conditions as pregnancy.52 And the testimony of a veteri-
narian has been used in reference to the question of whether a
particular bathing solution prescribed by defendant veterinarian
was strong enough to cause the death of dogs bathed in it.53 It
is improper and incompetent for a witness qualified as an expert
to state his opinion that the injury resulted from improper vac-
cination by use of an unclean needle where the witness has no
personal knowledge of the method of vaccination adopted and
the question has not been put to him hypothetically.54
Conclusion
We have seen that the veterinarian's liability is measured
by the same basic standards applicable to physicians and sur-
geons.55 In both fields the technical nature of the malpractice
action creates special problems. To determine the issue of li-
ability the jury must identify both the historical facts and the
standard of care. Attempting to resolve issues of medical fact
may be difficult for a lay jury; such resolution demanding as it
does, not merely an appraisal of the witnesses' demeanor and
character, but an evaluation of their stories in the context of the
situation giving rise to the cause of action. Thus, in a mal-
practice action arising out of an alleged improper injection,
the jury analysis would require some understanding of the re-
sults of giving the injection in various places, the skill required
in pinpointing a particular area, and the likelihood of an un-
warranted injection.5 6 The courts, in the relatively few reported
cases, have realistically applied the standards for liability, recog-
nizing the problems encountered by the veterinarian in exami-
nation, diagnosis and preparation for treatment.
51 Olander v. Johnson, 258 Il1. App. 89 (1930).
52 Brockett v. Abbe, 3 Conn. Cir. 12; 206 A. 2d 447 (1964).
53 Kerbow v. Bell, 259 P. 2d 317 (Okla. 1953).
54 Phillips v. Leuth, supra note 28; Annot., supra note 11 at 508.
55 Note 10 supra.
56 Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 333 (1963).
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